Thirty-eight dishonest tricks

Check out Thirty-eight dishonest tricks which are commonly used in argument, with the methods of overcoming them here

This is taken from "Straight and crooked thinking" by Robert H. Thouless, Pan Books, ISBN 0 330 24127 3, copyright 1930, 1953 and 1974. Heartily recommended.

 The thirty-eight dishonest tricks of argument described in the present book are the following:
(1) The use of emotionally toned words (pp 10-25)
(2) Making a statement in which "all" is implied but "some" is true (pp 27-38)
(3) Proof by selected instances (pp 32-37)
(4) Extension of an opponent's proposition by contradiction or by misrepresentation of it (pp 39-43)
(5) Evasion of a sound refutation of an argument by the use of a sophistical formula (pp 41-44) (6) Diversion to another question, to a side issue, or by irrelevant objection (pp 44-48)
(7) Proof by inconsequent argument (pp 49-50)
(8) The argument that we should not make efforts against X which is admittedly evil because there is a worse evil Y against which our efforts should be directed (pp 50-52)
(9) The recommendation of a position because it is a mean between two extremes (pp 52-54)
(10) Pointing out the logical correctness of the form of an argument whose premisses contain doubtful or untrue statements of fact (p 58)
(11) The use of an argument of logically unsound form (pp 58-64)
(13) Begging the question (pp 65-66)
(14) Discussing a verbal proposition as if it were a factual one, or failing to disentangle the verbal and factual elements in a proposition that is partly both (pp 67-77)
(15) Putting forward a tautology (such as that too much of the thing attacked is bad) as if it were a factual judgement (pp 71-72)
(16) The use of a speculative argument (pp 78-83)
(17) Change in the meaning of a term during the course of an argument (pp 88-94)
(18) The use of a dilemma which ignores a continuous series of possibilities between the two extremes presented (pp 103-105)
(19) The use of the fact of continuity between them to throw doubt on a real difference between two things (the "argument of the beard") (pp 105-108)
(20) Illegitimate use of or demand for definition (p 109)
(21) Suggestion by repeated affirmation (pp 111-114)
(22) Suggestion by use of a confident manner (pp 114-115)
(23) Suggestion by prestige (pp 115-118)
(24) Prestige by false credentials (pp 115-118)
(25) Prestige by the use of pseudo-technical jargon (pp 116-118)
(26) Affectation of failure to understand backed by prestige (pp 118-119)
(27) The use of questions drawing out damaging admissions (pp 199-120)
(28) The appeal to mere authority (pp 122-125)
(29) Overcoming resistance to a doubtful proposition by a preliminary statement of a few easily accepted ones (pp 128-130)
(30) Statement of a doubtful proposition in such a way that it fits in with the thought- habits or the prejudices of the hearer (pp 133-135 and p 157)
A habit of questioning what appears obvious is the best safeguard against this trick. A particular device of value against it is to restate a questionable proposition in a new context in which one's thought-habits do not lead to its acceptance.
(31) The use of generally accepted formulae of predigested though as premisses in argument (pp 161-166)
(32) "There is much to be said on both sides, so no decision can be made either way", or any other formula leading to the attitude of academic detachment (pp 166-167)
(33) Argument by mere analogy (pp 169-178)
(34) Argument by forced analogy (pp 178-179)
(35) Angering an opponent in order that he may argue badly (pp 146-147)
(36) Special pleading (pp 154-156)
(37) Commending or condemning a proposition because of its practical consequences to the bearer (pp 157-158)
(38) Argument by attributing prejudices or motives to one's opponent (p 159)